










This	 article	 seeks	 to	 review	 the	 recent	 incarnation	of	 a	 long-standing	 engagement	 in	 international	
political	 economy	 (IPE)	 and	 critical	 theory	 between	 open	 Marxist	 perspectives	 (OMPs)	 and	 their	
critics.	 The	 paper	 aims	 to	 identify	 the	 enduring	 relevance	 of	 this	 debate	 in	 order	 to	 constructively	
think	about	the	possibility	and	future	of	critical	social	inquiry	in	our	time.	It	criticises	elements	on	both	
sides	of	the	debate	that	no	longer	serve	but	rather	hinder	achieving	this	objective.	We	argue	that	the	
recent	 criticisms	 make	 a	 number	 of	 important	 constructive	 points	 that	 could	 help	 enhance	 the	













OMPs’	 explanation	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 international	 political	 economy	 and	 the	 interaction	





critical	 engagement	 (Barker,	 1978;	 Lacher,	 2002)	 between	 the	 two	 theoretical	 strands	 which	





but	 portray	 the	 latter	 uncharitably.	We	 further	 argue	 that	 a	 similar	 representation	 can	 also	 be	
found	 in	 the	 first	wave	of	criticism.	This	 representation	takes	the	 form	of	a	 tendency	to	equate	




critical	 social	 theory.ii	 It	 should	 be	 added	 that	 responses	 from	 OM	 scholars	 have	 similarly	
reciprocated	 this	 tone	 in	 tackling	 the	 criticisms	 which	 has	 ultimately	 reproduced	 the	 previous	
debates	and	led	to	an	unproductive	impasse.		
	
Given	 the	 current	 level	 of	 the	 debate	 between	OMPs	 and	 their	 critics,	 particularly	 neo-
Gramscian	approaches,	it	seems	odd	to	recall	that	collaborative	work	was	undertaken	by	authors	
from	both	perspectives	(Bieler	et	al.	2006).	Indeed,	the	debate	has	now	ossified	to	such	an	extent	
that	 not	 only	 does	 collaborative	work	 now	 seem	unlikely	 but	 dialogue	 itself	 has	 broken	 down.	
More	 importantly	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 debate	 evolved	 has	 forestalled	 the	 further	
development	 of	 critical	 theory	 in	 IPE	 and	 IR	 as	 originally	 intended	 by	 its	 proponents.	 A	 recent	
example	 of	 this	 debate	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 exchange	 between	 between	 Greig	 Charnock	
(2010:1283,	 1295-1296),	who	 identifies	 the	work	of	Henri	Lefebvre	as	 compatible	with	OMPs	 in	
challenge	 of	 the	 regulation	 approach	 and	 new	 state	 spatialities	 literature,	 and	 Stuart	 Elden	 &	
Adam	 Morton	 (2015:1f1),	 who	 accuse	 Charnock	 of	 claiming	 exclusive	 “proprietorship”	 over	
Lefebvre’s	work.iii	We	do	not	mean	to	claim	that	any	and	all	criticism	is	unfair	but	that	the	nature	




to	 everyone’s	 satisfaction.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 this	 paper	 we	 intend	 to	 emphasise	 and	 draw	
attention	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 debate	 for	 the	 scholarship	 as	 a	 whole	 and	 to	 trace	 the	
possibilities	of	how	productive	dialogue	between	two	 important	strands	of	 radical	 thought	may	
resume	on	this	basis.	
	
To	achieve	 this,	we	emphasise	which	criticisms	 in	 fact	address	 the	challenges	of	Marxist	
theorising,	 critical	 theory	 and	 empirical	 inquiry	 as	 a	whole	 and	which	 are	 specifically	 aimed	 at	
OMPs.	 We	 intend	 to	 position	 the	 open	 Marxist	 critique	 of	 mainstream	 and	 other	 Marxist	
approaches	while	 clarifying	 its	purpose	and	boundaries.	 In	doing	 so	we	hope	 the	nature	of	 this	
critical	 engagement	 could	move	 away	 from	a	 pattern	where	 each	 side	 of	 perspectives	 pull	 the	
other	 towards	 the	contours	of	 their	 frameworks	of	 reference	and	push	back	when	these	efforts	
fail.	 Instead	 the	 two	 vantage	points	 could	be	 acknowledged	and	delineated	 in	 a	manner	which	
would	enrich	rather	than	undermine	one	another.	Finally	we	conclude	with	the	implications	of	this	
critical	dialogue	between	these	critical	IR/IPE	theories	on	the	possibility	and	the	future	of	critical	
theory	 and	 social	 empirical	 inquiry.	 This	 is	 deemed	 particularly	 important	 as	 related	 to	 the	
analyses	of	the	recent	and	on-going	global	crisis,	which	present	theoretical	and	methodological	
challenges	 and	 should	 provoke	 new	 forms	 of	 thinking	 within	 the	 study	 of	 critical	 political	
economy.	
	
The	 paper	 begins	 by	 outlining	 the	 current	 critiques	 of	 OMPs	 which	 is	 followed	 by	 an	
account	 of	 open	 Marxism	 that	 responds	 to	 these	 criticisms	 in	 a	 constructive	 fashion	 before	
outlining	the	significance	of	this	debate	more	broadly.	The	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	emphasise	the	
importance	 of	 openness	 and	 historical	 enquiry	 to	 critical	 social	 theory,	 and	 particularly	 the	
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Marxist	 tradition	 with	 an	 understanding	 that	 these	 two	 strands	 of	 radical	 scholarship	 have	 as	
many	 commonalities	 as	 differences	 to	 be	 able	 to	 build	 more	 constructively	 on	 furthering	 the	
debates	 and	 struggles	 of	 emancipation	 in	 contemporary	 capitalism.	 We	 do	 not	 argue	 that	











1. A	 “reluctance	 to	 develop	 a	 historicised	 account	 of	 the	 uneven	 and	 combined	
development	 of	 capitalism”,	 which	 is	 problematic	 as	 it	 does	 not	 explain	 the	
development	 of	 capitalism	 within	 already	 extant,	 pre-capitalist	 territorial	
structures,	states	(Bieler	et.	al.,	2010:27)	

















these	 conclusions	 following	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 “foundations	 of	Open	Marxism”	 (ibid:26;	 Bruff,	
2009:333).	In	our	view,	however,	the	representations	of	OMPs	in	these	criticisms	suffer	from	a	lack	
of	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	 heterogeneous	 character	 of	 this	 scholarship	 and	 conflating	
“foundations”	 with	 subtleties	 in	 individual	 scholars’	 perspectives.	 The	 character	 of	 the	 latest	
debate	also	reflects	frequent	uses	of	argument	from	analogy	by	both	sides	which	aim	to	point	out	
to	 perceived	methodological	 and	 conceptual	 issues	 relating	 to	 uses	 and	 abuses	 of	 abstraction	
(Bonefeld,	 2009;	 Bruff,	 2009,	 Bieler	 et.	 al.	 2010).	 We	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 vital	 to	 approach	 such	





In	 various	 accounts	 (Bieler	 &	 Morton	 2003;	 Bruff,	 2009;	 Bieler	 et.	 al.,	 2010),	 the	
aforementioned	problems	are	argued	to	stem	from	an	elemental	issue	underlying	and	intrinsic	to	
OM:	a	“totalising	ontology”	which	conceives	capitalist	social	relations	as	the	“single	constitutive	
source”	 of	 human	activity	 (Bieler	 and	Morton,	 2003:	 473;	Bruff	 2009:333).	 This	 point	 echoes	 an	
earlier	critique	where	abstraction	in	OMPs	is	argued	to	be	reduced	to	the	“constituting	power	of	
labour	within	 a	mode	of	 production”	with	 an	 “almost	 exclusive	 concern	with	 the	 capital-labour	
relation”	(Roberts,	2002:	98,	101).	Coupled	with	the	charges	of	state-centrism	and	functionalism	
that	 correlate	 the	 purpose	 and	 function	 of	 state	 action	 to	 the	maintenance	 of	 capitalist	 social	
relations,	 critics	 suggest	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 pre-capitalist	 social	 formations	 and	 the	 varieties	 of	
capitalism	 and	 state	 forms	 they	 detect	 in	 different	 historical	 periods	 and	 territorial	 contexts	
present	themselves	as	aspects	of	social	reality	unacknowledged	and	unaccounted	for	within	the	






scholars	 who	 have	 been	 homogeneously	 identified	 as	Open	 Marxists.	 Rather	 than	 taking	 into	
account	 the	 heterogeneous	 approaches	within	OMPs,	 authors	 are	 clumped	 together	 such	 that	
one	 author’s	 view	 must	 be	 shared	 by	 all	 OMPs.	 As	 such,	 Bruff	 concludes	 that	 OMPs	 offer	 a	
determinist	 and	 totalising	 ontology	 in	 their	 account	 of	 capitalist	 social	 relations	 as	 inherently	






alleged	 reluctance	 within	 OMPs	 to	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 pre-capitalist	 transition	 into	
capitalism	appears	to	resonate	well	with	the	criticism	against	its	subsequent	refusal	to	provide	a	
historical	 periodisation	 of	 capitalist	 development.	 Similarly	 the	 alleged	 state-centrism	 and	
functionalism	 detected	 in	OMPs	 connects	 to	 the	 critique	 against	 determinism	 regarding	 social	
change	which	is	also	a	point	that	links	to	the	aforementioned	objections	on	the	basis	of	the	role	of	
history	 and	 a	 historicised	 methodology.	 Similar	 lines	 of	 criticism	 from	 OMPs	 have	 also	 been	
voiced	 against	 their	 critics	 in	 their	 response.	 Since	 this	 proves	 to	 be	 a	 largely	 unproductive	
intellectual	exchange,	the	role	of	evident	challenges	at	the	heart	of	the	theorising	of	state	within	
Marxian	 schools	 of	 thought,	 not	 solely	 within	 its	 OM	 or	 Neo-Gramscian	 variant,	 should	 be	
emphasised	here.	 They	demonstrate	 the	difficulties	 present	 in	 each	 strand	of	 theorising	of	 the	





The	debates	 regarding	 the	 transition	 from	 feudalism	 to	 capitalism	have	 long	 introduced	
fault	lines	within	different	Marxist	approaches	since	their	inception	in	the	1970s	(Anderson,	1974;	
Brenner,	 1977;	 Sweezy	 et.	 al.,	 1978;	 Holton,	 1985:	 Burnham,	 2002;	 Wood,	 2002;	 Bieler	 and	
Morton,	2013).	As	Wood	(2002:	30)	notes,	 it	represents	an	“irreducible	contradiction…	rooted	in	
the	nature	of	capitalism”	itself.	
It	 has	 also	become	one	of	 the	 fundamental	 lines	of	 critique	 against	OMPs.	This	 critique	
forms	 the	 key	 component	 of	 an	 alleged	 totalising	 ontology	 centred	 solely	 on	 capitalist	 social	
relations	 and	 its	 state-centrism.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 purported	 correspondence	 between	 the	
functions	of	the	capitalist	state	and	the	maintenance	of	capitalist	social	relations.	In	other	words,	
the	 totalising	 nature	 of	 the	 open	 Marxist	 account	 of	 social	 relations	 leads	 to	 the	 state	 being	
inherently	 a	 capitalist	 state.	 Moreover,	 recent	 critics	 have	 claimed,	 following	 the	 first	 wave	
(Barker	 1978:118),	 that	 open	 Marxism	 has	 not	 only	 failed	 to	 account	 for	 the	 historical	
development	of	the	contemporary	state	system	but	argued	that	the	contemporary	state	system	
can	only	be	understood	in	terms	of	capitalist	social	relations	(Bruff	2009:340;	Tsolakis	2010:397;	
Lacher	 2006:54).	 Bieler,	 Bruff	 and	 Morton	 (2010:28)	 maintain	 this	 criticism	 by	 arguing	 that	
Holloway	 (1991:231;	 1994)	 understands	 the	 state	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 development	 of	 global	
capitalist	 relations	 (see	 also	 Susen,	 2012:	 299	with	 respect	 to	Holloway	 (2010)).viii	 They	 further	
support	it	through	reference	to	Bonefeld’s	(2008:67)	assertion	that	the	modern	state	system	and	
the	capitalist	mode	of	production	developed	at	the	same	time,	and	in	tandem.	Their	point,	on	the	
other	 hand,	 is	 that	 not	 all	 states	 developed	 as	 manifestations	 of	 capitalist	 relations	 but	 that	
capitalism	emerged	into	an	already-existing	state	system.	
	
The	 contemporary	 relevance	 of	 the	 transition	 debate	 for	 criticisms	 charged	 against	OM	
rests	more	on	the	alleged	ahistoricism	and	reluctance	to	distinguish	between	“different	forms	of	












open	Marxism	puts	 forward	not	 a	 “historical	 determination”	 (quoting	Bonefeld,	 1993:	 21)	but	 a	
“universal-within-historical	determination	of	all	social	relations	by	capitalist	social	relations”	now	
that	the	latter	is	the	“constitutive	source	of	human	social	practice	in	capitalist	societies”	(ibid.:339,	
emphasis	added).	 It	 is	unclear	how	such	a	 reading	of	 the	OM	scholarship	could	be	upheld	 from	












Either	 the	 criticism	 offered	 is	 that	 OMPs	 reject	 the	 existence	 of	 states	 prior	 to	 the	
development	of	capitalism,	or	that	the	mode	of	production	exists	somehow	separately	from	the	
state.	 The	 former	 would	 be	 an	 absurd	 claim	 and	 a	 very	 uncharitable	 interpretation	 of	 OM	
accounts	of	the	state	and	its	historical	development,	the	latter	is	a	deeply	problematic	reading	of	
the	 historical	 development	 of	 capitalism	 that	 necessarily	 separates	 the	 economic	 and	 political	
facets	of	social	relations	–	the	very	antithesis	of	a	Marxist	account	of	social	relations.	The	problem	
of	 historical	 periodization	within	 capitalism	 derives	 directly	 from	 this	 point.	OMPs’	 critics	 have	
suggested	that	absolutism,	a	transitional	social	 form,	existed	between	feudalism	and	capitalism	
(Bieler	 &	 Morton	 2013:30;	 Morton	 2005:497;	 Teschke	 2003:74).	 This	 distinct	 period	 saw	 the	
formation	of	the	sovereign	state	and	the	modern	state	system;	however,	the	authors	argue	this	
period	 took	place	 “before	 the	 emergence	 and	 spread	of	 capitalism”	 (Bieler	&	Morton	2013:30).	
The	 identification	 of	 this	 peculiar	 transitional	 society,	 however,	 raises	 within	Marxist	 historical	
materialism	a	question	about	why	absolutism	needs	to	be	identified	as	a	distinct	historical	epoch	
and	 if	 so	 how	 its	 relationship	with	 social	 relations	 of	 production	 is	 established.	 In	 other	words,	
why	is	it	not,	for	example,	presented	as	the	nascent	manifestation	of	capitalist	social	relations?	
	




the	 scholars	 treat	 the	 state	 “as	 if	 it	 existed	only	 in	 the	 singular”	 (1978:	 118).	 Lacher	 (2002:	 153)	
similarly	emphasises	that	“that	the	capitalist	state	does	not	exist	in	the	singular	but	as	one	among	
many	is	thus	not	directly	given	by	the	capital	relation”.	It	is	worth	noting	that	Lacher’s	own	views	
of	 historical	 materialism	 diverge	 from	 the	 Marxist	 tradition	 in	 a	 number	 of	 key	 ways	 (Burns	
2010:236).	 Indeed,	 Lacher	 (2006:31)	 rejects	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 mode	 of	 production	 to	 the	




Burns’	 view	 or	 not,	 we	 contend	 that	 the	 open	 Marxist	 account	 takes	 the	 view	 that	 the	





“Men	make	 their	 own	 history,	 but	 they	 do	 not	make	 it	 as	 they	 please;	 they	 do	 not	
make	it	under	self-selected	circumstances,	but	under	circumstances	existing	already,	
given	and	transmitted	from	the	past.	The	tradition	of	all	dead	generations	weighs	like	














of	 antagonistic	 elements,	 some	 relations	 belonging	 to	 earlier	 forms	 of	 society	 are	
frequently	to	be	found	in	it	but	in	a	crippled	state	or	as	a	travesty	of	their	former	self,	
as	 e.g.	 communal	 property.	While	 it	may	 be	 said,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 categories	 of	
bourgeois	economy	contain	what	is	true	of	all	other	forms	of	society,	the	statement	is	




maintains	 the	 emphasis	 Marx	 placed	 upon	 understanding	 the	 complexity	 of	 social	 life	 more	
broadly.	 Social	 relations	 have	 to	 be	 contextualised	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 historically	 conditioned	
circumstances;	 however,	 they	 can	 only	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 here	 and	 now	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
capitalist	mode	of	production	 in	all	of	 its	 inherent	antagonisms	and	contradictions	 (Marx	[1859]	
1971:20-21;	 Bonefeld	 2009,	 2014:166).	 Once	 this	 is	 understood,	 history	 then	 stops	 being	 a	









analytically	 helpful	 as	 saying	 that	 capitalism	was	 born	 into	 an	 already-developed	 international	
trading	system.	
	




“Proudhon	 and	 others	 naturally	 find	 it	 very	 pleasant,	 when	 they	 do	 not	 know	 the	
historical	 origin	 of	 a	 certain	 economic	 phenomenon,	 to	 give	 it	 a	 historico-
philosophical	explanation	by	going	into	mythology.	Adam	or	Prometheus	bit	upon	the	
scheme	cut	and	dried,	whereupon	it	was	adopted,	etc.	Nothing	is	more	tediously	dry	
than	 the	 dreaming	 locus	 communis…	Whenever	we	 speak,	 therefore,	 of	 production,	






















alongside	 the	 constraints	 imposed	 by	 the	 capitalist	 state	 form	 and	 class	 struggle,	 “the	 various	
political,	economic,	cultural,	and	ideological	attributes	of	the	particular	state	in	question”	need	to	





assessment	of	different	periods/stages	 and	 forms	of	 capitalist	 social	 relations	within	or	outside	
OMPs	 are	 problematic	 or	 prone	 to	 reification.	 Typologies	 of	 state	 and	 stages	 of	 capitalist	






2.2	 The	 Structural-Functionalist	 Account	 of	 the	 State	 and	 Determinism	 Regarding	 Social	
Change	
The	underlying	logic	behind	this	dual	line	of	critique	of	OMPs,	as	Tsolakis	(2010:393-4)	puts	it,	lies	
in	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 state	 solely	 in	 regard	 to	 its	 function	 in	 capitalist	 social	 relations.	 In	
criticising	Burnham’s	understanding	of	 the	state,	Tsolakis	notes	 that	“the	state,	as	a	 regulative,	
well-defined	complex	of	 institutions,	always	sustains	the	abstract	discipline	of	the	world	market	
by	upholding	the	‘general	 interest’	of	capital	against	particular	corporative	interests	and	against	
labour	demands”	 (ibid.:394).	Moreover	he	contends	 that	OM	“often	conceptualises	 the	state	as	




the	 state	 is	 conceived	 of	 as	 fundamentally	 contradictory:	 its	 functions	 cannot	 be	 carried	 out	
successfully.	 Indeed,	 this	 criticism	 supposes	 that	 the	 interests	 of	 capital-in-general	 can	 be	
understood	 unambiguously,	 and	 that	 strategies	 in	 pursuit	 of	 them	 can	 even	 be	 meaningfully	
measured	 in	 terms	 of	 success	 or	 failure	 in	 a	 transhistorical	 fashion.	 Both	 of	 these	 points	 are	
explicitly	 rejected	 by	OMPs	 (Burnham	 1994b;	 2006,	 Kettell,	 2008).	 It	 is	 also	worth	 considering	









state	 and	 subsequent	 debate	 in	Marxist	 theory	 leading	 to	 inherited	 issues	 which	 are	 currently	




characteristic	 of	 the	 social	 formation	 within	 which	 it	 operates	 (Clarke,	 1991:	 19-20).	 With	
hindsight	 there	 has	 been	 a	 recent	 appreciation	 of	 the	 subtleties	 of	 the	 debate	 beyond	 the	
simplistic	and	formulaic	assessments	(Wetherly	et.	al.,	2008).	It	has	been	acknowledged	that	both	
scholars	 in	fact	explored	the	different	aspects	of	the	problem	employing	different	methods	and	






state	 relations	due	 to	 the	very	 fact	 that	 it	 arises	out	of	 these	 contradictory	 social	 relations	and	
appears	 autonomous	 from	 them	 (Bonefeld,	Brown,	Burnham,	 1995:	 166).	However,	 in	 line	with	
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the	points	made	by	Roberts	 (2002:	91-99)	regarding	the	role	of	abstraction	 in	Marxist	theory,	 it	
should	be	noted	that	the	level	of	abstraction	in	the	specification	of	the	state-form	is	not	the	same	
as	 the	 specification	 of	 state	management	 (Burnham	 1995:	 102),	 and	more	 precisely,	 statecraft	
(Burnham	1994a:5;	2007).	Therefore	it	fails	to	extend	beyond	the	standard	charges	made	within	
different	Marxist	 strands	 against	 one	 another,	 as	OMPs	 do	 not	 suggest	 that	 the	 functions	 are	
fulfilled	completely	and	without	contradiction	and	disruption.	
	
Bieler	et	al.	 (2010:27)	criticise	OMPs	 for	state-centrism	and,	as	with	Tsolakis	 (2010),	also	
condemn	OM’s	characterisation	of	the	state	as	a	“functional	guarantor”	for	capital	accumulation.	
This	undoubtedly	derives	from	an	account	by	OM	authors	of	states	as	“regulative	agencies”	in	the	
reproduction	 of	 global	 capitalist	 society	 (Burnham	 2001a:110;	 see	 also	 Clarke	 1983:118).	 This	
representation,	however,	fails	to	treat	fairly	the	point	that	these	regulative	agencies	are	seen	by	
OMPs	not	solely	as	regulating	the	reproduction	of	society	by	acting	in	the	interests	of	capital-in	












the	 range	of	 structures	 that	might	undertake	 their	performance,	and	 the	conditions	
which	might	mean	their	non-performance,	are	explicitly	problematised”	
	
In	 fact,	 for	 OMPs,	 the	 state	 has	 a	 plethora	 of	 strategies	 available	 to	 it	 with	 which	 to	
manage	social	 relations,	each	of	which	has	 to	be	contextualized	under	very	particular	historical	
and	 geographical	 circumstances	 as	 also	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 (Holloway	 1995:121).	
Moreover,	as	the	state	is	seen	as	a	manifestation	of	capitalist	social	relations,	which	are	inherently	
contradictory,	these	strategies	are	not	successful	in	perpetuity	and	require	continuous	adaptation	
and	 change.	 These	 changes	 have	 been	 characterized	 by	 OM’s	 critics	 at	 a	 level	 of	 abstraction	
different	from	OMPs	as	either	typologies	of	state,	or	stages	of	capitalist	development.		
	
	 The	 criticism	 that	OMPs	 conceive	of	 the	 state	as	 a	unitary	political	 actor	 seems	hard	 to	
accept,	 especially	 given	 the	work	 of	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 in	 determining	 the	 various	 struggles	
over	 policy	 (Burnham	 1990,	 2003;	 Bonefeld	 1993;	 Kettell	 2004;	 Rogers	 2012).	 Bieler	 &	Morton	
(2013:29)	also	make	the	claim	that,	while	authors	such	as	Burnham,	Kettell	and	Rogers	produce	
interesting	work,	 they	 do	 not	 offer	 a	 “class	 analysis	 but	 [revert]	 back	 to	 the	 state-centrism	 so	
characteristic	of	mainstream	IR”.	This	seems	a	particularly	unconstructive	critique	given	the	class	







helping	 to	 clarify	 the	 key	 political	 economy	 problems	 which	 beset	 modern	
governments,	 but	 the	 twists	 and	 turns	 of	 the	 policymaking	 process	 can	 only	 be	
revealed	by	close	empirical	study	of	government	personnel	at	particular	moments	… It	
is	 important	 therefore	 that	 the	 component	parts	of	 the	 ‘state’	 are	disaggregated	 to	




emphasise	 that	 both	 approaches	 in	 fact	 retain	 their	 starting	 point	 in	 the	Marxist	 theorising	 of	
state	and	social	relations	and	provide	insights	into	different	yet	complementary	and	equally	valid	
aspects	 of	 critical	 social	 inquiry.	 They	 both	 also	 retain	 shortcomings	 in	 common	 with	 Marxist	
theorising	of	state.	Tsolakis	 (2010:	388)	suggests	 that	both	OM	and	neo-Gramscian	approaches	
do	 not	 directly	 specify	 the	 state	 as	 a	 terrain	 of	 struggle	 between	 different	 social	 forces	 and	
fractions	of	capital,	endowed	with	the	kind	of	contradictions	brought	by	these	internal/domestic	
actors	and	forces.	In	that	sense	it	is	true	that	OM	does	not	treat	the	state	as	such,	which	could	be	
considered	 as	 a	 strength,	 especially	 in	 comparison	 with	 perspectives	 that	 often	 use	 such	 a	
position	to	propose	the	so-called	neutrality	of	 the	 liberal	pluralist	state.	However,	 this	does	not	
mean	 that	 the	state-form	 itself	 is	devoid	of	 internal	 contradictions.	Quite	 the	contrary.	Various	
concrete	manifestations	of	these	internal	contradictions	can	be	found	in	the	specific	analyses	of	











that	OMPs	are	at	 least	 sceptical	of	claims	 that	 the	state	can	be	a	 force	 for	emancipatory	social	
change,	and	at	most	totally	rejects	such	claims.	Bieler	at	al	(2010:32-34)	criticise	the	philosophy	of	
revolution	 in	 OM	 as	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	 egocentric	 philosophy	 of	 Max	 Stirner.	 This	
criticism	is	established	through	close	reading	of	the	work	of,	principally,	Psychopedis	(2005)	and	
Holloway	 (2005a;	 2005b).x	 Susen	 (2012:	 311)	 similarly	 charges	 Holloway’s	 (2010)	 approach	 of	
engaging	with	 all	 possible	 –isms	 as	 outlined	 above.	 	On	 this	 basis	 a	 further	 criticism	 is	 derived	
(Bruff	 2009a,	 2009b;	 Bieler	 at	 al.	 2010)	 that	 OM	 rejects	 transhistorical	 qualities	 of	 human	
existence.	This	 seems	particularly	galling	 from	a	Marxist	historical	materialism,	especially	given	
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the	 preference	 of	 the	 critics	 to	 quote	 from	 The	 German	 Ideology	 ([1845]	 1998:2),	 which	




terms	 of	 their	 understanding	 of	 OMPs,	 we	would	 like	 to	 emphasise	 that	 there	 is	 considerable	
variation	 among	 the	 individual	 perspectives	 of	 scholars	 within	 broader	 OMPs	 and	 specific,	
relevant	points	of	critique	and	objections	are	certainly	needed	to	move	the	debate	and	dialogue	





Before	 initiating	 a	 response	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 two	 directions	 of	 critique,	which	 take	 their	
starting	 point	 from	 the	 argument	 that	 OM	 rests	 upon	 a	 “totalising	 ontology”,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	
delineate	 the	 shared	 premises	 of	 OM	 as	 a	 whole	 rather	 than	 generalising	 from	 the	 individual	
differences	of	viewpoints.	As	noted	earlier	the	body	of	work	under	scrutiny	is	heterogeneous	and	








works	 such	as	Burnham	 (2001),	Kettell	 (2004;	2008),	Rogers	 (2009).	Simultaneously	 the	 fluidity	
and	 imprecision	 (i.e.	 excessive	 openness)	 of	 the	 OM	 concepts	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 socially	
embedded	 theory	 of	 revolution	 are	 criticised	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 works	 of	 Gunn	 (1992),	




too	 convenient	 and	generic	 line	of	 critique.	These	 subtleties	 tend	not	 to	be	acknowledged	and	






by	 the	political	and	 ideological	orientation	and	strategies	of	different	Marxist	 interpretations	 in	
transcending	capitalist	social	relations	within	different	historical	contexts.	This	holds	true	also	for	









the	 exacerbation	 of	 the	 problems	within	 existing	 socialist	 countries	 and	 their	 repercussions	 on	
theory	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 the	 issues	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 social	 democratic	 project	 and	 larger	
emancipatory	 political	 practice	 in	 Europe.	 Whilst	 both	 the	 Soviet	 experience	 and	 social	
democratic	 political	 practice	 suggested	 the	 possibility,	 albeit	 in	 different	 forms,	 that	 the	 state	
apparatus	could	be	taken	over	and	transformed	for	emancipatory	ends	in	transforming	capitalist	
social	 relations,	 the	 reality	 increasingly	 seemed	 to	 be	 proving	 these	 assumptions	wrong	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 1970s.	The	 limitations	 set	 against	 state	 action	due	 to	 the	dynamics	 of	 capitalist	










premises	of	 the	heterogeneous	OM	perspectives.	They	 characterise	open	Marxism	as	 a	 ‘critical	
theoretical	questioning	of	taken-for-granted	assumptions	about	the	social	world	and	the	practical	
conditions	of	dominance	and	subordination	in	capitalism’	(2003:468).	While	it	seems	likely	that	all	
varieties	 of	 Marxism	 would	 make	 claim	 to	 the	 same	 critical	 credentials,	 open	 Marxist	




social	 relations,	 particularly	 class	 struggle.	 This	 openness	 is	 certainly	 a	 response	 to	 the	
determinism	of	structural	Marxism	(Bieler	and	Morton,	2003:	470)	but	reflects	a	more	significant	
acceptance	 of	 how	 class	 struggle	 manifests	 in	 myriad	 and	 unexpected	 ways	 (Bonefeld	 et	 al.	
1992:xvi).	 As	 such,	 openness	 also	 refers	 to	 the	 exploration	 of	 social	 categories	 in	 order	 to	
comprehend	 the	 social	 relations	 that	 underlie	 them	 (ibid.).	 However,	 stemming	 from	 this	





Most	of	 the	aforementioned	 critiques	have	been	directed	against	 an	allegedly	 totalising	
ontology	 of	 OM	 at	 its	 source	 as	 noted	 earlier.	 However,	 the	 alternative	 proposals	 appear	 to	
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involve	 historical	 periodisation	 of	 capitalist	 development,	 introduction	 of	 various	 categories	 of	
different	types	and	forms	of	states.	This	pluralises	the	conceptual	tools	and/or	introduces	distinct	
categories	 in	 order	 to	 account	 for	 the	 specificity	 of	 each	moment	 and	 form	 of	 broader	 social	
relations.	This	can	be	more	accurately	identified	as	a	golden	mean,	or	Goldilocks,	fallacy	in	which	





particularities	of	 the	OM	vs.	Neo-Gramscian	 (or	broadly	non-OM)	debate,	 a	broader	discussion	





grasp	 the	 complexity	 of	 social	 reality	 is	 straightforward	 when	 the	 goal	 of	 inquiry	 itself	 is	
understanding	 and/or	 explanation.	 The	 challenge	 arises	 when	 the	 issue	 of	 critique	 is	 taken	 on	
board	 and	 elevated	 to	 become	 a	 key	 objective	 of	 inquiry	 especially	 given	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
concepts	often	tend	to	assume	thing-like	qualities	and/or	treated	as	such.	The	latter	aspect	in	the	
act	of	theorising	and	devising	conceptual	tools	is	what	progressively	brings	critique	its	internally	





same	 critical	 gaze	 we	 examine	 our	 objects	 of	 inquiry,	 applying	 the	 same	 criteria	 against	
reification.	Indeed,	this	appears	to	be	one	of	the	major	points	of	Bruff	(2009):	that	OM	does	a	lot	
of	critiquing,	very	 little	explaining	and	to	do	well	 in	 the	 latter	one	needs	his	 tools	–	and	a	 lot	of	
them.	Against	this	background,	OM	could	surely	be	criticised	if	it	has	indeed	come	to	think	that	its	
abstract	constructs	fully	correspond	to	concrete	reality.	However	there	is	plenty	of	evidence	from	





that	 OM	 conceives	 the	 concrete	 to	 be	 solely	 represented	 by	 its	 abstraction	 of	 capitalist	 social	
relations.	 Therefore,	 the	 critique	 is	 synchronised	 between	 a	 “totalising	 ontology”	 and	
“epistemological	austerity”	as	 the	 latter	 is	 linked	to	a	more	elemental	 form	of	 reification	of	 the	
abstract	 in	 concrete	 in	 OM.	 Bieler	 et.	 al.	 (2010)	 emphasise	 that	 the	 unresponsiveness	 of	 OM	
scholars	 toward	 these	 repeated	 critiques	 has	 ultimately	 made	 the	 OM	 standpoint	 difficult	 for	
them	 to	 constructively	 engage	with.	Moreover,	 concerns	 have	 arisen	whether	 it	 could	 ever	 be	
conceived	 to	be	a	plausible	 critical	 IR/IPE	 theory	 at	 all	 or	 be	positioned	 rather	 as	 a	 “neo-realist	
moment	within	 a	Marxist	 perspective”	 (Bieler	 et.	 al.,	 2010:	 29).	 To	put	 forward	 such	a	 critique,	
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however,	brings	about	the	difficulty	of	settling	accounts	with	the	Marxist	building	blocks	of	OMPs	






the	aforementioned	 criticisms	as	 shared	 concerns	 and	 challenges	of	 theorising	 state	 and	 social	
relations	from	within	a	Marxist	framework.	In	its	current	form,	however,	the	common	ground	the	





constructive	 path	 rather	 than	 allow	 it	 undermine	 each	 side	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 charges	 of	
reductionism,	 instrumentalism,	 determinism,	 functionalism	 and	 not	 being	 truly	 or	 sufficiently	








to	 explore	 and	 assess	 the	 possibility	 and	 future	 of	 critical	 social	 inquiry	 within	 politics	 and	
international	 studies.	 Our	 focus,	 as	 such,	 has	 been	 on	 the	 value	 that	 can	 be	 provided	 by	 a	
substantial	engagement	with	OMPs	in	particular.	We	argue	that	OMPs	deserves	the	utmost	credit	











































Bonefeld,	Werner	 and	 Kosmas	 Psychopedis	 (eds)	 (2001)	 The	 Politics	 of	 Change:	 Globalization,	
Ideology	and	Critique	Palgrave	Hampshire		




Bonefeld,	W.,	Gunn,	 R.,	Holloway,	 J.	&	 Psychopedis,	 K.	 (eds)	 (1995)	Open	Marxism	Volume	 III:	
Emancipating	Marx	(Pluto	Press	London)		
Bonefeld,	 W.	 (1993)	 The	 Recomposition	 of	 the	 British	 State	 during	 the	 1980s	 (Aldershot:	
 17 
Dartmouth)		
Bonefeld,	W.,	 Gunn,	 R.	 &	 Psychopedis,	 K.	 (eds)	 (1992b)	Open	Marxism	 Volume	 II:	 Theory	 and	
Practice	(Pluto	Press	London)	























































Holloway	 J.,	Picciotto	S.	 (1991)	Capital,	Crisis	 and	 the	State,	 in	Clarke	S	 (ed)	The	State	Debate	
Basingstoke:	Macmillan	































Morton,	 A	 D	 (2005)	 The	 Age	 of	 Absolutism:	 Capitalism,	 the	 Modern	 States-	 system	 and	
International	Relations	Review	of	International	Studies	31:3		
	














































                                                
i	We	 shall	however	be	using	 the	 term	open	Marxist	perspectives	 (OMPs)	 to	be	able	 to	better	 reflect	 the	
heterogeneous	character	of	this	body	of	scholarship.	





troubling	 aspect”	 in	 “such	 Open	 Marxism”	 by	 claiming	 proprietorship	 over	 Lefebvre’s	 work.	 However,	
Charnock	(2010:1292)	himself	(on	their	page	reference)	merely	claims	“it	is	possible	to	derive	a	challenge	





OMPs-NG	 debate	 despite	 the	 fact	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 former,	 it	 has	 long	 been	 acknowledged	 that	
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vii	 Adam	 Morton	 (2006:63-64)	 has	 previously,	 and	 quite	 rightly,	 criticized	 mainstream	 ‘critical’	 IPE	
scholarship	 for	 its	 lack	 of	 engagement	with	 class	 struggle,	 instead	 characterizing	 this	writing	 as	 “liberal	
pluralist	 idealism”.	 Ironically,	 Randall	 Germain	 (2007:128),	 offering	 an	 alternative	 and	 non-Marxist	
historical	materialism,	 then	 portrayed	Morton	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	Morton	 himself	 characterizes	 OM,	
describing	 his	 approach	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 “monological	Marxism”.	 In	 another	 example	 of	 scholarly	 parallels,	








x	 However	 the	 content	 of	 this	 critique	 relies	 mainly	 on	 guilt	 by	 association	 in	 our	 view,	 deriving	 from	
Psychopedis’	 (2005:78)	 direct	 reference	 to	 Stirner	 and	 his	 influence	 on	 Marx’s	 understanding	 of	 social	
change.	Psychopedis’	claim	does	not	accept	the	ego-centrism	of	Stirner,	rather	his	argument	follows	the	
form	of	Marx’s	 own	 understanding	 of	 social	 change.	 Psychopedis	 (2005:88-92)	 also	makes	 a	 number	 of	
references	 to	Kant’s	 contributions	 to	 the	debate	on	 social	 change	but	OM’s	 critics	have	 so	 far	 refrained	
from	labeling	OM	a	Liberal	Idealist	theory.	
xi	 This	 could	 be	 explicitly	 seen	 in	 Bruff's	 “alternative”	 proposal	 of	 taking	 the	 transhistorical	 elements	 of	
human	social	practice,	the	need	to	produce,	survive...etc,	as	the	constitutive	starting	point	and	accept	the	
multidimensional	 characteristics	 of	 sources	 of	 human	 practice	 despite	 still	 attributing	 a	 certain	 primacy	
over	capitalist	social	practices	within	capitalist	social	formations	(2009).	For	a	critique	see	Bonefeld	(2009).	
